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Intoxication and Third Parties
John Vamis*
J3ERSONS UNDER THE INFLUENCE of liquor or drugs are known to
be irrational, uncoordinated, erratic and prone to conduct
which give rise to injury. It is for this reason that recovery is
allowed, under certain conditions, from the person furnishing
the intoxicating liquor or drug, by the person injured by the user.
One such liable person is the seller of intoxicating liquor who, by
the Dram Shop Law, is made liable to persons who suffer injury
to person or property or to means of support. The first such law
in Ohio was passed on May 1, 1854, and was entitled, "An act
to provide against the evils resulting from sale of intoxicating
liquors in the State of Ohio."' There are today variations of
the Dram Shop Law in Ohio and twenty-seven other states. 2
At common law the intoxicated person is held to the same
standard of conduct as that of a reasonable man.3 If the intoxi-
cated person breaches a duty of care and by his negligent con-
duct causes injury, as a proximate result of this conduct, which
is reasonably foreseeable, he is liable.4 The duty of care owed to
an intoxicated person is that owed to a reasonable man.5 Under
the common law, therefore, recovery from the seller of intoxi-
cating liquor by third parties injured by the acts of the intoxi-
cated person has generally been barred because the proximate
cause of the injury has been deemed to be the consumption of
the liquor rather than the sale of the liquor.
* MA., University of Chicago; M. P. A., University of Michigan; a Senior
at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 67 Ohio Laws 102.
2 These states are Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin. 48 C. J. S., Intoxicating Liquors,
Sec. 431, pp. 717-718.
3 Powell v. Berry (1916) 145 Ga. 696, 89 S. E. 753, L. R. A. 1917 A. 306.
4 Ibid.
5 Little Rock & Electric Co. v. Billings (1909 C. C. A. 8) 173 F. 903, 31
L. R. A. N. S. 1031, 19 Ann. Cas. 1173.
6 Hilson v. Dwyer (1943) 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P. 2d 952; Noonan v.
Gulick (1955) 19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A. 2d 892; Buntin v. Hutton (1917)
206 111. App. 194; Cavin v. Smith (1949) 228 Minn. 322, 37 N. W. 2d 368; Peter
Anderson & Co. v. Diaz (1906) 77 Ark. 606, 92 S. W. 861; Lammers v. Pacific
Electric R. Co. (1921) 186 Cal. 379, 199 P. 523.
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Another bar has been the rule that the consumption of
liquor is contributory negligence.7 In spite of this rule pre-
venting recovery, there have been several significant cases
under the common law which have allowed recovery against
the seller of intoxicating liquor on the basic theory of negligence.
The opinions of these cases have tended to change the duty of
care of the seller of intoxicating liquors or remove the duty of
care owed by the intoxicated personf In these latter cases
allowing recovery, the intoxicated person is viewed as other
than a reasonable man. Of great significance is the concept that
the intoxicated person lacks voluntary control over his conduct.
Generally, in the common law, recovery has been permitted
to third persons, from the seller of habit forming drugs, for
injury resulting from the act of the person under the influence
of the drug.10 Courts have generally found the use of drugs of a
habit forming nature to be involuntary, and have assessed
liability for the continued sale to a person known to be addicted."
There are cases holding contra which will be treated in this
article.
Except for actions brought under the dram shop law, re-
covery against the seller is generally brought on the basis of
wrongful death, loss of consortium, loss of services, or loss of
support. Indeed, both in the common law and under the dram
shop law relief has generally been accorded to the spouse or
children of the person under the influence. The dram shop law
has extended the classification of persons to employers and to
persons receiving injury to person or property by the acts of
the intoxicated person.
In addition to the seller there are two other groups of
persons who have been held liable for injuries to innocent third
persons by the acts of intoxicated persons. These groups are
public carriers and innkeepers. The groups are included in order
to distinguish the nature of liability arising from that of the
7 Schwartz v. Johnson (1926) 152 Tenn. 586, 280 S. W. 32, 47 A. L. R. 323;
Covington v. Lee (1905), 28 Ky. L. Rep. 492, 89 S. W. 493, 2 L. R. A. N. S.
481.
8 Rappaport v. Nichols (1959) 31 N. J. 188, 156 A. 2d 1, 75 A. L. R. 2d 821;
Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dept. Store (1959 C. A. 7) 269 F. 2d 322.
9 Pratt v. Daly (1940) 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P. 2d 147.
10 Hoard v. Peck (1867) 56 Barb (N. Y.) 202; Holleman v. Harward (1896)
119 N. C. 150, 25 S. E. 972, 975, 34 L. R. A. 803; Flandermeyer v. Cooper(1912) 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N. E. 102, 40 L. R. A. N. S. 360.
11 Ibid.
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seller. Both these former groups are under a high duty of care
to a passenger or patron as the case may be. Generally, their
standard of care as to an intoxicated person is not increased
over that owing to any other person. Negligence here generally
results from the foreseeability of the imminence of injury from
the apparent conduct of the person seen or known to be intoxi-
cated. The standard breached is that of an ordinary person of
reasonable intelligence. There have been cases where a bar
owner has been found negligent not for the sale of intoxicating
liquor but as the owner of the bar responsible for the safety of
his patrons.
liability of Carriers
Injury to an innocent third party may arise in the common
carrier where a passenger is assaulted by an intoxicated fellow
passenger. Although a carrier is not an insurer of the safety
of a passenger, it must exercise the highest degree of care
(higher than ordinary care) that is practicable under the cir-
cumstances of the particular case in order to prevent an assault
by one passenger upon another.1 2
The degree of care and test in breach of duty appears to be
the following: A common carrier is not liable for an assault by
a stranger on a passenger, if it could not have anticipated and
prevented the assault by the exercise of the proper degree of
care and prudence. 1 3 A carrier will be held liable, however,
for an assault on a passenger by a stranger, if it could have been
anticipated and prevented by the exercise of reasonable care and
diligence. 14
The mere fact that a carrier admits an intoxicated person,
with the knowledge that he is intoxicated, or fails to eject him
after knowing that he is intoxicated, is insufficient to make
the carrier liable where the intoxicated person attacks and
injures a fellow passenger.15 If, however, the carrier has sufficient
12 Willie Floyd v. City of Cleveland (1955) 99 Ohio App. 282, 56 Ohio Op.
21, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 563, 123 N. E. 2d 540; Paal v. Cleveland R. Co. (1918)
11 Ohio App. 462.
13 Irwin v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (1909) 161 Ala. 489, 50 S. 62, 135 Am. St.
Rep. 153, 18 Ann. Cas. 772; Beasley v. Hines (1920) 143 Ark. 54, 219 S. W.
757, 15 A. L. R. 864.
14 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Pillsbury (1887) 123 Ill. 9, 14 N. E. 22, 5 Am. St.
Rep. 483; Dean v. St. Paul Union Depot Co. (1889) 41 Minn. 360, 43 N. W.
54, 5 L. R. A. 442, 16 Am. St. Rep. 703.
15 Brown v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. (1905 C. C. A. 8) 139 F. 972, 2
L. R. A. N. S. 105, 3 Ann. Cas. 251; Lige v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (1915)
275 Mo. 249, 204 S. W. 508, L. R. A. 1918 F. 548.
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opportunity to observe the conduct of the intoxicated person
and such conduct provides sufficient evidence within the vision
and hearing of the carrier so that the attack of the intoxicated
person upon another passenger could have reasonably been
anticipated from the antecedent conduct which was negligently
permitted to continue, the carrier will be liable.16
Generally, the courts have held that it is a question for the
jury whether a carrier's employees, in the exercise of that
degree of care required by law, ought to have foreseen and pre-
vented, from the circumstances of the cases, an assault by an
intoxicated passenger who was upon the premises.
17
Innkeepers, Restaurateur, Tavern Keepers
These groups are considered together because as a class
of third persons incurring liability, they are generally treated
similarly by the courts.
This group is treated here not as a seller of liquor but as
a proprietor supervising, controlling and caring for the premises.
It is not uncommon for a patron to receive injuries on the
premises from acts of another intoxicated patron.
The prevailing rule is that innkeepers and similar proprietors
are not insurers for the safety, quiet, and repose of their
patrons.' s Also, these proprietors do not owe the same duty of
care owed by carriers to passengers. The obligation of innkeepers
and other proprietors is the exercise of reasonable care for their
safety."" There are statements, however, indicating that inn-
keepers are responsible for the exercise of a "high degree" of
care to prevent injury to their guests.2 0
Innkeepers have been held liable for an injury to a guest
from an assault by another guest or a third person.2 1 Owners
16 Montgomery Traction Co. v. Whatley (1907) 152 Ala. 101, 44 S. 538, 126
Am. St. Rep. 17; Hillman v. Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. (1906) 126 Ga. 814, 56
S. E. 68, 8 Ann. Cas. 222.
17 Jansen v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. (1910) 112 Minn. 496, 128 N. W.
826, 32 L. R. A. N. S. 1206; Kline v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co.
(1911) 146 Wis. 134, 131 N. W. 427, Ann. Cas. 1912 C. 267.
18 Weeks v. McNulty (1898) 101 Tenn. 495, 48 S. W. 809, 43 L. R. A. 185,
170 Am. St. Rep. 693; Montfort v. West Texas Hotel Co. (1938) (Tex. Civ.
App.) 117 S. W. 2d 811.
19 Clancy v. Barker (1904) 131 F. 161, 69 L. R. A. 653; Rahmel v. Lehndorff
(1904) 142 Cal. 681, 76 P. 659, 65 L. R. A. 88, 100 Am. St. Rep. 154.
20 Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, Inc. (1955) 5 Ill. App. 2d 327, 125 N. E. 2d 544.
21 Rommel v. Schambacker (1887) 120 Pa. 579, 11 A. 779, 6 Am. St. Rep.
732.
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or operators of restaurants or similar places of business have
frequently been held not liable to a patron injured as the result
of an assault by another guest, or a fight between guests.2 2 Under
both circumstances the cases would indicate that determination of
liability depends upon awareness of the proprietor of the threat
of attack, ability to afford protection, and negligence or careless-
ness in the refusal of the proprietor to interfere and stop an
attack which proximately resulted in injury to the patron.23
If the premises are saloons or other places serving intoxi-
cating liquor, the courts generally interpret the exercise of rea-
sonable care to be a relative term where the degree of care must
be commensurate with the risk and injuries attending the activity
being pursued.2 4 It is said to be a subject of common knowledge
that the consumption of a procession of drinks of intoxicating
liquors produces a variety of reactions in the deportment of
human beings, the development of which the tavern keeper
should be reasonably alert to detect..2 5 At times the duty of care
is said to be that no injury to a patron occur by any want of care
on the part of the tavern keeper's servants, extended even to
seeing that reasonable care is exercised that guests are not
injured by other guests.26 Courts have expressly indicated their
support of the view that the proprietor of a saloon or similar
place has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect patrons
from injury by other patrons.27
Consortium, Loss of Support, Loss of Service
Consortium has been defined as the conjugal fellowship of
husband and wife, and the right of each to the company, coop-
eration and aid of the other in every conjugal relation. 2
22 Hughes v. Coniglio (1946) 147 Neb. 829, 25 N. W. 2d 405; Fred Harvey,
Inc. v. Comegys (1921 Tex. Civ. App.) 233 S. W. 601; Weihert v. Piccione
(1956) 273 Wis. 448, 78 N. W. 2d 757.
23 Greco v. Sumner Tavern, Inc. (1955) 333 Mass. 144, 128 N. E. 2d 788;
McFadden v. Bancroft Hotel Corp. (1943) 313 Mass. 56, 46 N. E. 2d 573;
Priewe v. Bartz (1957) 249 Minn 488, 83 N. W. 2d 116, 70 A. L. R. 2d 621.
24 Reilly v. 180 Club, Inc. (1951) 14 N. J. Super. 420, 82 A. 2d 210.
25 Ibid.
26 McKeon v. Manze (1916, Sup.) 157 N. Y. S. 613.
27 Moon v. Conley (1918) 9 Ohio App. 16, 30 Ohio C. A. 14; Giamarito v.
Zissen's White Horse Cafe (1937) 57 Ohio App. 517, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 657,
15 N. E. 2d 162; Thornton v. Goldfarb (1952, App.) 67 Ohio L. Abs. 232,
119 N. E. 2d 446.
28 McKinnon v. Chenoweth (1945) 176 Or. 74, 155 P. 2d 944, 948.
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The loss of consortium is a deprivation of the full society,
affection, and assistance to which a spouse is entitled.
2 9
Loss of services which legally belong to the plaintiff has
been held to constitute an injury to property for which recovery
may be had. The loss of services sustained by a parent in the
wrongful death of a minor is the value of the services that such
parent would be entitled to between the death and the majority
of such minor.30 The purpose of the law is to authorize suits for
the recovery of damages for the death of minors caused by the
wrongful acts and negligence of others.
3 1
The word support, according to Webster, means maintenance,
subsistence, or an income sufficient for the support of a family.
32
Support, as used in laws, making licensed saloon keepers liable
on their bond for illegal sales to any person who shall sustain
any injury or damage to his means of support on account of the
use of such intoxicating liquors so sold, is necessarily a flexible
term. It should not be limited to mean actual necessaries of life,
or that one's means of support is only damaged, where such
person is reduced to a state of dependency. Hence the loss of
the services of a son, who contributed by his earnings to the
expenses of his father's family, is a damage to the father's means
of support, though the earnings of the father may be sufficient
to keep the family from becoming dependent.
33
Duties incident to the domestic establishment include duties
a wife owes to the husband by reason of the relation existing
between them. Although these are generally denominated
"services," they also include care, comfort, companionship,
society and fellowship, and such other matters as are included
under the head of consortium. It is for the loss of these
''services" that the common law grants to the husband a right
of action.34
It is commonly recognized that one particular group of
persons that is particularly harmed by the acts of intoxicated
person or persons under the influence of habit forming drugs
is the family of such persons. There is, both under the common
29 Henley v. Rockett (1942) 243 Ala. 172, 8 S. 2d 852, 853.
30 Meeks v. Johnston (1923) 85 Fla. 248, 95 S. 670, 671.
31 Nolan v. Moore (1921) 81 Fla. 600, 88 S. 601, 606.
32 40 Words & Phrases 802.
3 Reath v. State (1896) 16 Ind. App. 146, 44 N. E. 808, 809.
34 Reeves v. Lutz (1914) 179 Mo. App. 61, 162 S. W. 280.
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law and under the dram shop statutes, recognition of injury in
loss of consortium, loss of services, and loss of support.
In an early case in Ohio 351 recovery for loss of support was
sought and obtained by a widow under the first Liquor Control
Act of Ohio, which read as follows: "That every wife, child, par-
ent, guardian, employer or other person who shaH be injured in
person or property or means of support by any intoxicated
person, or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or other-
wise, of any person, such wife, child, parent, guardian, employer
or other person shall have a right of action, in his or her own
name, against any person, who shall by selling intoxicating
liquors contrary to this act, have caused the intoxication of
such person, for all damages actually sustained as well as
exemplary damages." 36
In another case37 in Ohio a wife recovered under the com-
mon law for loss of consortium resulting from the sale of mor-
phine to her husband, who prior to such sale was a cured
morphine addict. The court cited authority to hold that the
right of recovery was a common law right requiring no enabling
statute.
3
Generally at common law there is no right of recovery to
the wife for loss of consortium of the husband. 39 A wife cannot
recover damages on account of personal injuries to her husband
where she sustains loss of support and of consortium and is
compelled to care for him while sick.40 A wife usually cannot
recover for loss of consortium as a result of negligent injury to
her husband although in recent years some states have allowed
recovery.41
Where the former disabilities of the married woman have
been removed the wife long has been allowed a right of action
for loss of consortium in certain cases. Recovery has been al-
lowed in cases in which there has occurred direct interference
to consortium resulting from alienation or willful acts directed
35 Schneider v. Hosier (1871) 21 Ohio St. 98.
36 "An act to provide against the evils resulting from sale of intoxicating
liquors in the State of Ohio." S. & C. 1139, May 1, 1854.
37 Flandermyer v. Cooper, supra note 10.
38 Bigaouette v. Paulet (1883) 134 Mass. 123, 45 Am. Rep. 307.
39 Kosciolak v. Portland R. Light & P. Co. (1916) 81 Or. 517, 160 P. 132.
40 Emerson v. Taylor (1918 Md.) 104 A. 538.
41 Knierim v. Izo (1961 111.) 174 N. E. 2d 157 (no recovery); Smith v.
Nicholas Bldg. Co., supra note 34 (no recovery). Recovery allowed in Dini
v. Naiditch (1960 Ill.) 170 N. E. 2d 881, citing Iowa, Mich., Ark., D. C.
Jan., 1962
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against the husband. In the latter class there have been cases
deemed to be a direct interference in the selling of intoxicants
or drugs to the husband under the civil damages acts. The sale
of liquor or drugs to the husband after due notice has been given
to the seller has been held to involve the element of malice in
direct interference with consortium. 42
Wrongful Death
In actions for wrongful death, as in the case of actions for
personal injuries generally, 43 it is essential to a recovery of
damages that the wrongful act, the neglect, or the default of
the defendant should have been the proximate cause of the
injury and of the death resulting therefrom. 44
Where a suicide is caused by the use of intoxicating liquors,
it seems that an action will lie under a civil damage act against
the person who sold the liquor, to recover damages for the loss
of maintenance and support.45 The cases on this point are some-
what conflicting but it seems that as a general rule the answer
to the question whether there may be a recovery under a civil
damage act for injury or damage remotely as well as proximately
due to intoxication depends usually upon the phraseology of the
statute.
The type of act most frequently found provides for recovery
against the dealer for injury to person, property, or means of
support, by an intoxicated person, or in consequence of the
intoxication of any person. Where, under such a law, an action
is brought for an injury inflicted by the affirmative act of an
intoxicated person, and is therefore based on the clause "by an
intoxicated person," the courts are practically unanimous in
holding that it is not necessary that the intoxication be the
proximate cause of the injury.46 Where, on the other hand, an
42 Clark v. Hill (1897) 69 Mo. App. 541; Flandermeyer v. Cooper, supra
note 10.
43 Winona v. Botzet (1909 C. C. A. 8) 169 F. 321, 23 L. R. A. 204; Good-
lander Mill Co. v. Standard Oil Co. (1894 C. C. A. 8) 63 F. 400, 27 L. R. A.
583.
44 Larrissey v. Norwalk Truck Lines (1951) 155 Ohio St. 207; Avra v.
Karshner (1929) 32 Ohio App. 492, 168 N. E. 237; 16 Am. Jur. 57 Sec. 77;
Proximate Cause Annot: 23 A. L. R. 1271; 58 Am. St. Rep. 714; Ann. Cas.
1914 C. 1101.
45 Lawson v. Eggleston (1898) 28 App. Div. 52, 52 N. Y. S. 181, affd. without
op. 164 N. Y.; Garrigan v. Kennedy (1904) 19 S. D. 11, 101 N. W. 1081, 117
Am. St. Rep. 927, 8 Ann. Cas. 1125.
46 Jack v. Prosperity Globe (1909) 147 Ill. App. 176; Whiteside v. O'Con-
nors (1911) 162 Ill. App. 108; Neu v. McKechnie (1884) 95 N. Y. 632, 47 Am.
Rep. 89.
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action is based upon the clause giving a right of action for in-
juries "in consequence of" the intoxication, or its equivalent, it
is held by some courts that there can be no recovery unless
intoxication was the proximate cause of the injury.47
Habit Forming Drugs
The seller of drugs is under only an ordinary standard of
care in the sale of drugs. The test of ordinary care, however,
is that of the average druggist, and in the dispensing of drugs
of a dangerous nature he must act with the highest degree of
caution.48 Due to the nature of drug dispensing, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur often is applied. Under this doctrine the drug-
gist is said to have the sole control of the drugs which he offers
for sale, both harmful and harmless ones.
The relation of the druggist to the community is such that
there is an obligation upon him to see that no harmful or poison-
ous drugs shall be delivered to a customer when a harmless one
is asked for. Proof of inadvertence on the part of the druggist
furnishes an inference sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
It raises a presumption of negligence which entitles the customer
to recover unless the presumption is rebutted.49 Thus negligence
is presumed and proof of facts establishes prima facie negligence,
unless the presumption is rebutted, where it is alleged that a
drug clerk by mistake sold and delivered an injurious drug to
a customer instead of a harmless drug asked for, where the
customer innocently swallowed the former in reliance and belief
he was taking the latter, and was caused pain and suffering. 50
In an interesting early Ohio case both intoxication and the
taking of a drug were operative facts in a wrongful death action.
The ruling in the case illustrates the distinction maintained as
to the standard of conduct applied to the intoxicated man. Here
a druggist sold strychnine to an intoxicated man at the request
of the intoxicated man and neglected to put upon the package
the label required by law, as a notice and warning of the con-
tents. The purchaser, while still intoxicated, took the strychnine
47 Bestline v. Ney Bros. (1907) 134 Iowa 172, 111 N. W. 422, 13 L. R. A.
N. S. 1158, 13 Ann. Cas. 196.
48 Corona Coal Co. v. Sexton (1925) 21 Ala. App. 51, 105 S. 716, cert. den.
213 Ala. 554, 150 So. 718; Peters v. Johnson (Peters v. Jackson) (1902) 50
W. Va. 644, 41 S. E. 190, 57 L. R. A. 428, 88 Am. St. Rep. 909.
41 Edelstein et al. Partners v. Cook (1923) 108 Ohio St. 346; 19 Corpus
Juris 780.
5o 19 Corpus Jur. 785; Knofel v. Atkins (1907) 40 Ind. App. 428, 81 N. E.
600; Butterfield v. Snellenburg (1911) 231 Pa. 88, 79 A. 980.
Jan., 1962
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and died from the effect of it. The court held that the act of
selling the poison and neglecting to label it were not, either the
one or the other, the proximate cause of death. The proximate
cause was the act of the man himself in taking the poison, for
which the druggist is not responsible in damages.51
It has been held that at common law a husband has a right
of action for loss of consortium and loss of services of his wife
against a druggist who sells a habit forming drug to the wife
knowing that she intends to satisfy her craving for the drug and
that her husband has not consented to the sale.52 A similar
common law right is held to exist for the wife for the loss of
consortium in some states where married women's acts have
removed the disabilities of coverture.5 3
In one case a right of action was given to parents for loss
of services of a minor child to whom large doses of heroin
tablets were repeatedly sold by a pharmacist who had knowl-
edge of the minor's addiction.54 In the above cases it was held
that the right existed both where the sale was made without the
knowledge of the spouse bringing the action and where the spouse
had knowledge and protested the sale. It was not a requirement
that the sale be unlawful. Rather the criterion applied was that
there was knowledge that the drug was of a habit forming nature
and that the purpose of the sale was to satisfy the craving. In
all cases there were findings that the continued use of the drug
was ruinous to the health of the user.
In one case the duty breached by the druggist was found
to be as follows: It seems to be a most reasonable proposition
of law that whoever willfully joins with a married woman in
doing an act which deprives her husband of her services and of
her companionship is liable to the husband in damages for his
conduct. The defendants owed to the plaintiff the legal duty
not to sell opium to his wife in the form of large quantities of
laudanum as a beverage, knowing that she was, by using them,
destroying mind and body, and thereby causing loss to the
husband. 55
51 Ronker et al. v. St. John (1900) 11 Ohio C. Dec. 434.
52 Hoard v. Peck (1867) 56 Barb (N. Y.) 202; Holleman v. Harward (1896)
119 N. C. 150, 25 S. E. 972, 34 L. R. A. 803, 56 Am. St. Rep. 672.
53 Flandermeyer v. Cooper, supra note 10; Moberg v. Scott (1917) 38 S. D.
422, 161 N. W. 998, L. R. A. 1917 D. 732. See supra note 41.
54 Tidd v. Skinner (1919) 225 N. Y. 422, 122 N. E. 247, 3 A. L. R. 1145 affg.
(1916) 171 App. Div. 98, 156 N. Y. S. 885.
r5 Holleman v. Harward, supra note 52.
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In another case the effect upon the person using the drug
was described as follows:
"--no longer a free agent capable of controlling his own con-
duct, and capable of exercising an independent judgment in ref-
erence to the use of this drug, but, on the contrary, his intellect
had become so weakened and infirm that his power of resisting
his craving therefor was entirely destroyed, and he became
merely the instrument or the conduit through which this treach-
erous poison was transferred from the druggist's hands into his
own system." 56
It would appear that in these cases the person buying the
drug was not considered to be contributorily negligent. If the
party bringing the action contributes in whole or in part to the
development of the drug habit, it is likely that the rule applicable
to the dram shop laws denying recovery, would apply.57
Common Law Dramshop Liability
Discussion in this section will deal with the liability of the
seller arising under the common law, apart from the dram shop
statutes.
Generally, the seller of intoxicating liquors is not answer-
able at common law to third parties as a result of injury or dam-
age sustained by the latter as a result of the intoxication of the
purchaser of the liquor51 The reason for the lack of common
law basis for the action is given in one case as follows:
"The common law gave no remedy for injury or death fol-
lowing the mere sale of liquor to an ordinary man, either on
the theory that it was a direct wrong, or on the ground that it
was negligence which imposed a legal liability on the seller for
damage resulting from the intoxication, the reasoning being that
the drinking, not the selling, was the proximate cause of the in-
jury." 59
56 Flandermeyer v. Cooper, supra note 10.
57 Forsberg v. Around Town Club (1942) 316 Ill. App. 661, 45 N. E. 2d 513;
Morton v. Roth (1915) 189 Mich. 198, 155 N. W. 459.
58 Collier v. Stametis (1945) 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P. 2d 125; Fleckner v. Dionne
(1949) 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P. 2d 530; Howlett v. Doglio (1949) 402 Ill.
311, 83 N. E. 2d 708, 6 A. L. R. 2d 790; Cowman v. Hanson (1958) 250 Iowa
358, 92 N. W. 2d 682; Barboza v. Deces (1942) 311 Mass. 10, 40 N. E. 2d 10;
Beck v. Groe (1955) 245 Minn. 28, 70 N. W. 2d 886, 52 A. L. R. 875.
59 Hill v. Alexander (1944) 321 Ill. App. 406, 53 N. E. 2d 307.
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Again, in another case the reasoning was given as follows:
"Apart from statute, the common law knows no right of ac-
tion against a seller of intoxicating liquors, as such, for causing
intoxication of the person whose negligent or wilful wrong has
caused injury. Human beings, drunk or sober, are responsible
for their own torts. The law apart from statute recognizes no
relation of proximate cause between a sale of liquor and a tort
committed by a buyer who has drunk the liquor." 60
There have been a number of notable exceptions in which
recovery was permitted to third persons for wilful violation by
the seller, to one other than the purchaser of the liquor, which
was proximate to the injury sustained by such third person. In
one case the sale of the liquor was made unlawful by state
statute. In this instance the sale was to a person already intoxi-
cated, who continued his drinking and drove into another state
where he fatally injured the third party. Under the common
law of the latter state the unlawful sale gave a civil right of ac-
tion in tort against the seller.6 1
In another case under similar circumstances a sale of intoxi-
cating liquor was made to a person who was both a minor and
intoxicated. This person injured a third person while driving.
The court upheld the right of recovery of the third person against
the seller on grounds of negligence under the common law as
follows:
The seller should have foreseen the unreasonable risk of
harm to others through the action of the intoxicated person.
The court refused to rule that as a matter of law there could have
been no causal relation between the selling and the injury.6 2
The cases are in conflict as to whether or not a recovery
may be made under the wrongful death statute. Recovery has
been allowed in some cases under circumstances in which there
was a wanton disregard of the decedent who at the time was in
no condition to observe ordinary care. 3 Recovery has been de-
nied in fact situations indicating that the intoxicated person was
60 State to Use of Joyce v. Hatfield (1951) 197 Md. 249, 78 A. 2d 754.
61 Waymek v. Chicago's Last Dept. Store, supra note 8.
62 Rappaport v. Nichols, supra note 8.
63 McCue v. Klein (1883) 60 Tex. 168, 48 Am. Rep. 260; Ibach v. Jackson
(1934) 148 Or. 92, 35 P. 2d 672; Riden v. Grimm Bros. (1896) 97 Tenn. 220,
365 S. W. 1097, 35 L. R. A. 587.
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol11/iss1/7
11 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
not in such a state of helplessness as to be deprived of his will
power or responsibility for his behavior. 4
Dram Shop Statutes
Statutes commonly known as "Civil Damage Acts" or "Dram
Shop Acts" have been passed in twenty-eight states, affording
remedies unknown to the common law.
Typical of the statute generally referred to as a dram shop
law is the Illinois statute, which reads as follows:
"Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or
other person, who shall be injured, in person or property, or
means of support, by any intoxicated person, or in consequence
of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall
have a right of action in his or her own name, severally or joint-
ly, against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving
alcoholic liquor, have caused the intoxication, in whole or in
part, of such person." 65
It will be seen that the statute imposes a liability upon the
person furnishing liquor under the Illinois statute in either a
sale or gift. This liability upon the furnisher is not one generally
imposed upon him by the common law."" Because of the severity
of the statute to the furnisher of liquor it is thought to be penal
in character and therefore should be strictly construed.6 7 Others
believe that the better view is that it is remedial in character
and should be construed so as to allow the full remedy accorded
within the clear meaning of the statute.0 8
The statute provides for situations in which there is injury
"by any intoxicated person" and also "in consequence of the in-
toxication" of any person. If the injury occurs as a result of the
affirmative act of the intoxicated person, the courts are almost
64 Cole v. Rush (1955) 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P. 2d 450, 54 A. L. R. 2d 1137;
Hoyt v. Tilton (1925) 81 N. H. 477, 128 A. 688; Bissell v. Starzinger (1900)
112 Iowa 266, 83 N. W. 1065; Bolen v. Still (1916) 123 Ark. 308, 185 S. W. 811.
65 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, ch. 43 par. 135.
66 Pierce v. Albanese (1925) 144 Conn. 241, 129 A. 2d 606; Thompson v.
Wogan (1941) 309 Ill. App. 413, 33 N. E. 2d 151; Beck v. Groe, supra note 58;
Mead v. Stratton (1882) 87 N. Y. 493, 41 Am. Rep. 386. See the Knievim
case, supra note 41.
67 Howlett v. Doglio (1949) 402 Ill. 311, 83 N. E. 2d 708, 6 A. L. R. 2d 120;
Cruse v. Aden (1889) 127 Ill. 231, 20 N. E. 73, 3 L. R. A. 327.
68 Economy Auto Ins. Co. v. Brown (1948) 334 111. App. 579, 79 N. E. 2d
854; Hahn v. Ortonville (1953) 238 Minn. 428, 57 N. W. 2d 254; Beck v. Groe,
supra note 58.
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unanimous in holding that intoxication needs not be the proxi-
mate cause of the injury.69
If the injury occurs "in consequence of, or by reason of, or
on account of" the intoxication of the person, it has been held in
some courts that there can be no recovery unless the intoxication
was the proximate cause of the injury.70 There is, however, au-
thority to the contrary.7 ' To illustrate the requirement of proxi-
mate causation, if recovery is sought for suicide resulting from
intoxication, the court might require that the plaintiff demon-
strate that the intoxication was the proximate cause of the in-
jury.72 There is authority that it is reversible error for a court
not to recognize the distinction between the two theories.73
Under the dram shop law it becomes possible to obtain re-
covery from the liquor furnisher for injury to the intoxicated
person from the wrongful act of a third person. This recovery
was allowed in some cases in which it was shown that the third
party was himself intoxicated by liquors furnished by the de-
fendant.74 On the other hand recovery has been denied generally
in cases in which the third party was not intoxicated.75
The statute gives the right of action to any person; however,
it specifically designates family members such as husband, wife,
child, and parent. The need to afford a remedy to family mem-
bers of the habitually intoxicated person has been recognized by
the courts in language such as the following:
"During the middle of the last century it became apparent
that great injury was often done to wives and children as a re-
sult of the sale of intoxicating liquor to those who would abuse
its use, and in many states what was commonly denominated
69 Cox v. Hresky (1943) 318 Ill. App. 287, 47 N. E. 2d 728; Bistline v. Ney
Bros., supra note 47; Currier v. McKee (1904) 99 Me. 364, 59 A. 422, 3 Ann.
Cas. 57.
70 Pierce v. Albanese, supra note 66; Schroeder v. Crawford (1880) 94 Ill.
357, 34 Am. Rep. 236; King v. Haley (1877) 86 Ill. 106, 29 Am. Rep. 14;
Schmidt v. Mitchell (1876) 84 Ill. 195, 25 Am. Rep. 446; Schugart v. Egan
(1876) 83 Ill. 56, 25 Am. Rep. 359.
71 Anno: Ann. Cas. 1917 B. 536.
72 Garrigan v. Kennedy, supra note 45.
73 Cope v. Gepford (1945) 326 Ill. App. 171, 61 N. E. 2d 394.
74 Horringths v. Troesch (1916) 201 Ill. App. 433; O'Connor v. Kathje (1939)
298 Ill. App. 489, 19 N. E. 2d 96; Cope v. Gepford, supra note 73. Brockway
v. Patterson (1888) 72 Mich. 122, 40 N. W. 192, L. L. R. A. 708.
75 Gage v. Harvey (1898) 66 Ark. 68, 48 S. W. 898, 43 L. R. A. 143; Shea v.
Slezak (1956) 20 Conn. Supp. 181, 129 A. 2d 233; Danhoff v. Osborn (1957)
11 Ill. 2d 77, 142 N. E. 2d 20, 65 A. L. R. 2d 917; Sworsk v. Colman (1939)
204 Minn. 474, 283 N. W. 778.
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civil damage acts were adopted. These acts, in substance, pro-
vided that if liquor was sold to a person under circumstances set
forth in the act, specified parties injured thereby in person, prop-
erty or lack of support might bring a suit against the vendor for
damages." 76
Generally, courts have interpreted the statute so that the
rights of recovery among the persons specifically designated are
confined to those related to the intoxicated person injured or re-
lated to the person injured by the intoxicated person. 7 Also re-
covery is permitted where a person is injured in property as a
result of the acts of the intoxicated person.78
The employer is another person specifically designated as
having a right of recovery. In an early Ohio case recovery was
allowed for a contractor against a person who sold liquor to the
contractor's hired hands who thereby became drunk and unable
to work and who impeded others from working and hindered
the progress of the job, whereby the contractor was injured in
property and means of support.79
The word person has been interpreted to allow recovery by
a township for damage to township property in at least one re-
cent case.80 It has not been interpreted to allow recovery by an
insurance company in its own name for property damage.8 '
However, recovery on a subrogation right has been permitted if
the insurance company is subrogated to the right of a person
who has a right in his own name under the statute.
8 2
A recent case of first impression in a Federal District Court,
deciding an action brought under the Minnesota Civil Damage
Act, allowed recovery to both the employer of the intoxicated
person and the insurance company of the employer, from a ven-
dor making an illegal liquor sale to the intoxicated employee.
76 Pratt v. Daly (1940) 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P. 2d 147.
77 Reisch v. Foster (1906) 125 Ill. App. 509; Minot v. Doherty (1909) 203
Mass. 37, 89 N. E. 188, 133 Am. St. Rep. 281; Fleming v. Gemein (1912) 168
Mich. 541, 134 N. W. 969, 39 L. R. A. N. S. 315.
78 Kennedy v. Whitteker (1899) 81 IM. App. 605; Flower v. Wikovsky (1888)
69 Mich. 371, 37 N. W. 364; Bertholf v. O'Reilly (1878) 74 N. Y. 509, 30 Am.
Rep. 323; Woolheather v. Risley (1874) 38 Iowa 486; Mulford v. Clewell
(1871) 21 Ohio St. 191.
79 Duroy v. Blinn and Letcher (1860) 11 Ohio St. 331.
80 Town of City of Champaign v. Overmeyer's (1958 Il1.) 152 N. E. 2d 752.
81 Economy Auto Ins. Co. v. Brown, supra note 68.
82 Dworak, For the Use of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Temple (1959) 17 Ill. 2d 181,
161 N. E. 2d 258.
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The employer and its insurance company had made payments to
parties injured as a result of an auto collision involving the in-
toxicated employee.8 3
In some states, including Ohio, the action against the seller
is allowed only if the seller has received a prohibitory notice.84
Another limitation upon recovery is a uniform rule that where
an injured person contributes in whole or in part to the intoxi-
cation of his assailant he cannot recover under the dram shop
law.8 5
A further limitation upon recovery is the requirement in
some state statutes that the sale by the seller of intoxicating
liquor be unlawful. In Ohio the pertinent portion of Sec. 4399.01
R. C. refers to prohibited sales of intoxicating liquor as defined in
Secs. 4301.01 and 4301.22, which restrict sales to minors, intoxi-
cated persons, and persons to whom sale cannot be made as de-
termined by the Department of Liquor Conrol.
Conclusion
In the foregoing survey of the law relating to intoxication
and to drug addiction, attention has been drawn to the rights or
liabilities of third parties arising from the conduct of persons
under the influence of liquor or drugs. An attempt has been
made to indicate generally those persons on whom the law im-
poses a liability and those for whom a remedy has been provided.
The discussion does not pretend to be exhaustive.
It would appear that, although the basic duty owed to an
intoxicated person or person under the influence of a drug is that
owed to an ordinary man, there is recognition of the fact that
the conduct of these persons often results in injury to innocent
third persons. There has been afforded under statutory law, and
in some court rulings based on common law, a remedy to innocent
persons against the seller of the drug or liquor or the person
83 Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Co. (1961 C. A. 8) 291 F. 2d 284.
84 Remon v. Spike (1951 Ohio App.) 109 N. E. 2d 327; Christoff v. Gradsky
(1956 Ohio C. P.) 140 N. E. 2d 586; Britton v. Samuels (1911) 143 Ky. 129,
136 S. W. 143, 34 L. R. A. N. S. 1036; Crist v. Kiltz (1939) 288 N. W. 175, 124
A. L. R. 1517.
85 Forsberg v. Around Town Club, supra note 57; Morton v. Roth, supra
note 57; Douglas v. Athens Market Corp. (1943) 320 Ill. App. 40, 49 N. E. 2d
834; Pearson v. Renfro (1943) 320 Ill. App. 202, 50 N. E. 2d 598; Kreps v.
D'Agostine (1946) 329 Ill. App. 190, 67 N. E. 2d 416; Cavin v. Smith (1949)
228 Minn. 322, 37 N. W. 2d 368; Thomas v. Danby (1889) 74 Mich. 398, 41
N. W. 1088.
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol11/iss1/7
90 11 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1) Jan., 1962
charged with a high duty of care for the safety of the person in-
jured. There is underlying this remedy a recognition that the
person under the influence of liquor or drug lacks (and is known
to lack) control over his actions. There is, therefore, a realiza-
tion that the negligence resulting in the injury is in the sale of
the liquor or drug or in the foreseeability of injury arising from
the obvious and apparent conduct of the person under the in-
fluence of liquor or drug.
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